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Abstract: This paper details liability issues inherent in bird–aircraft collisions (bird-strike) 
incidents at airports and discusses how airport managers and operators must strive to conduct 
accurate assessments and develop and implement an effective wildlife management plan. 
Such efforts are mandated by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, and failure to 
follow them may result in loss of human life and property, as well as large financial penalties 
for managers and operators and adverse media attention and public criticism for the airport 
authority. 
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Each year, the aviation industry is faced 
with the potential for extensive loss of life and 
property due to birds colliding with aircraft 
(bird strikes). As many species of birds compete 
for airspace with departing and approaching 
aircraft at airports worldwide, resulting bird 
strikes contribute to a substantial jeopardy to 
the safety record and financial well-being of 
airport operators and their managers (Dolbeer 
and Wright 2009, Dove et al. 2009, Klope et al. 
2009). The Federal Aviation Administration 
Wildlife Strike Database, compiled by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, documents the 
widespread and diverse nature of this problem. 
A total of 82,057 wildlife strike reports (98% 
involving birds) from 1,418 U.S. airports and 207 
foreign airports has been entered for the period 
January 1990 through December 2007, with 
7,666 strikes occurring in 2007. Sandra Wright, 
manager of the FAA Wildlife Strike Database, 
estimates that 80% of wildlife–aircraft strikes 
go unreported (Wright 2008).
In the past, federal, state, and provincial 
wildlife management programs have 
contributed to population increases in large-
bodied birds, such as cormorants (Phalacrocorax 
spp.), cranes (Grus spp.), geese (Branta spp.), 
gulls (Larus spp.), herons (e.g., Ardea herodias), 
pelicans (Pelecanus spp.), raptors (e.g., hawks 
[Buteo spp.]), owls (Bubo spp., Strix spp.), 
eagles (Haliaeetus spp., Aquila spp.; Figure 1), 
vultures (Cathartes spp., Coragyps spp.), and 
wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo; Cleary and 
Dolbeer 2005). Wildlife strikes cost the U.S. 
civil aviation industry approximately $500 
million and commercial air carriers worldwide 
>$1.2 billion annually. More than 194 people 
have died, and 164 aircraft have been destroyed 
as a result of bird and other wildlife strikes 
with civil and military aircraft from 1988 to 
2004 (Richardson and West 2000, Thorpe 2003, 
Cleary et al. 2004). 
The frequency and devastating consequences 
of bird strikes dictate that airport operators 
and managers must address the issues of 
organizational and personal liability. Airport 
managers and operators are being sued 
personally for human injuries and death, as 
well as property damage, in the aftermath 
of bird strikes. Further, regulatory agencies 
are using their law enforcement divisions to 
enforce permitting regulations to the extent that 
airport managers can face civil and criminal 
prosecution for violating federal regulation or 
taking either inappropriate action or no action 
at all to mitigate wildlife strikes. In such cases, 
liability may extend to members of the airport’s 
governing body. Moreover, the expenses for 
the ensuing legal defense are high. This paper 
details liability issues inherent in bird-strike 
incidents and discusses how airport managers 
must conduct accurate assessments and 
develop and implement an effective wildlife 
damage management plan, as directed by FAA 
regulations (FAA 2004).
Defining liability
The majority of wildlife strikes occurs within 
the immediate airport environment, and 74% 
of all strikes happens ≤152 m above ground 
level (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airports must 
be managed to be as unattractive to birds as 
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possible. The goal of wildlife managers on and 
around airports is to eliminate or minimize 
the carrying capacity of habitat for species 
that are hazardous to aviation (Cleary and 
Dolbeer 2005). Airport managers must accept 
the responsibility of implementing a wildlife 
damage management plan and carry out the 
many different aspects of such a plan that will 
make it successful. 
One of the most common liabilities to the air-
port manager is his failure to take the appropri-
ate actions that are legally required. Airport 
sponsors and managers have a responsibility 
under federal regulations (FAA 2004) to 
ensure the airport maintains a safe operating 
environment. They must take immediate action 
to alleviate wildlife hazards whenever they 
are detected. They must ensure that a wildlife 
hazard assessment is conducted when any of the 
following events occurs on or near the airport: 
An aircraft experiences a multiple 1. 
wildlife strike;
An aircraft experiences substantial 2. 
damage from striking wildlife;
An aircraft experiences an engine 3. 
ingestion of wildlife; and
Wildlife capable of causing damage is 4. 
observed to have access to any airport 
flight pattern or aircraft movement 
area (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). 
If any one of these events occurs, the 
airport operator must begin a wildlife hazard 
assessment to be conducted by a qualified 
wildlife damage management biologist over 
a 12-month period (FAA 2004). If the FAA 
determines that a wildlife hazard management 
plan is needed, the airport operator must then 
formulate and implement one using the wildlife 
hazard assessment as its basis (FAA 2004, 
Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). If federally listed or 
proposed endangered or threatened species are 
involved, or if designated or proposed critical 
habitat are present, the airport operator must 
prepare a biological assessment of the impacts 
of the wildlife hazard management plan on 
these species or habitats (FAA 2004, Cleary and 
Dolbeer 2005). 
The FAA has issued ≥2 advisory circulars 
(FAA Advisory Circulars 2004) concerning 
wildlife and airports, actively encouraging 
the reporting of wildlife strikes and providing 
guidance on certain land uses that have the 
potential to attract wildlife on or near public-
use airports (FAA 2004, Cleary and Dolbeer 
2005). 
Regulatory implications
Wildlife often is protected by overlapping 
federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and 
ordinances (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airport 
Figure 1. Raptors, such as this American bald eagle perched atop an airport runway sign at the Orlando 
Sanford International Airport, Florida, are among the birds that may pose a threat to aviation.
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managers must have a clear understanding of 
the responsibilities placed on them by these 
various restrictions. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS) has management authority for 
migratory birds and federally listed threatened 
and endangered wildlife species and has been 
given the primary regulatory responsibilities 
for such species and their habitat (FAA  2004, 
Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airport operators 
must know when to consult with FWS and obtain 
required permits prior to modifying designated 
or proposed critical habitat, taking wildlife (i.e., 
killing, removing eggs or relocating chicks), 
and harassing animals or excluding them (i.e., 
minimizing exposed areas that birds can use 
for perching and nesting; Cleary and Dolbeer 
2005). Currently, no method exists to obtain an 
FWS permit to remove American bald eagle 
(Haliaeetus leucocephalus) nests, eggs, or chicks. 
The regulatory authority for resident 
nonmigratory birds rests with the various 
state wildlife management agencies. States 
also may list certain wildlife as threatened or 
endangered that are not considered as such 
at the federal level (Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). 
Airport operators must first obtain a state 
depredation permit to take state-protected 
species or game birds outside the legal hunting 
season or beyond the established bag limits 
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). In August 2007, 
when FWS de-listed the American bald eagle 
from the threatened and endangered species 
list, the state of Florida followed suit and also 
de-listed the bald eagle. However, the Florida 
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 
has since adopted a bald eagle management 
plan that requires airport operators to obtain a 
bald eagle nest removal permit. It is doubtful, 
however, that such a permit will be issued until 
FWS adopts a similar management plan for the 
bald eagle. It is important that airport operators 
understand that the American bald eagle is still 
protected by the Bald and Golden Eagle Act 
of 1940, as amended in 1978, but this act has 
no provisions for permits of any kind. Given 
the ever-changing and conflicting regulatory 
environment, there is great potential for airport 
managers to become confused over this issue. 
The old adage that ignorance of the law is 
no excuse must weigh heavily on the airport 
manager’s decisions for action. 
Airport managers must still secure harass-
ment permits from the FWS and state agencies 
that allow only nonlethal methods of harassing 
bald eagles by using pyrotechnics (e.g., propane 
cannons, sirens, horns). But managers may 
not fire pyrotechnics directly at bald eagles. 
Accurate records of the methods and results 
of harassment must be kept by the airport 
manager, and these records must be sent to both 
federal and state agencies prior to the renewal 
of agency permits. Take- (i.e., kill) permits are 
still available to airport operators when it may 
be necessary to shoot certain other species as 
a control method at airports, but the airport 
manager must ensure that required federal and 
state wildlife kill-permits are in place and that 
accurate records, by species and date, of birds 
killed are kept. Further, city permits may be 
necessary to discharge a firearm within the city 
limits, and all local laws must be adhered to 
regarding certain distances of discharges from 
buildings and highways (Cleary and Dolbeer 
2005).
In some states, such as Florida, water 
management districts have jurisdiction over 
any habitat modifications that have impacts 
on wildlife habitat (especially wetlands). The 
airport operator must obtain an environmental 
resource permit before altering any viable 
wildlife habitat on the airport. If a wetland 
habitat is to be modified, it may be necessary to 
mitigate unavoidable wetland impacts before 
those impacts occur. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (COE) also has jurisdiction over 
certain wetlands, and airport managers should 
contact a professional wetland consultant 
qualified to delineate wetlands before any 
modifications are made to airports. If the COE 
has jurisdiction, then the airport must obtain a 
permit, along with a mitigation strategy, before 
any modification to wetlands can be undertaken 
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005).
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has some jurisdiction over endangered 
species. In some cases, the airport operator 
may wish to use chemical repellents, toxicants, 
and drugs to capture wildlife on the airport. 
One of the responsibilities of the EPA is the 
proper registration of these chemicals that are 
permitted through state and local governments 
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Only certified 
applicators (i.e., persons working under a 
certified applicator’s direct supervision) may 
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purchase and use restricted-use pesticides, 
and these are restricted to those uses covered 
by the applicator’s certification (Cleary and 
Dolbeer 2005). Airport managers must make 
absolutely certain that application of these 
types of chemicals is in strict compliance with 
these rules. 
The USDA and the FAA recommend 
elimination of any cover required by birds for 
resting, roosting, escape, and reproduction 
(Cleary and Dolbeer 2005). Airport operators 
should clear dense stands of trees and 
undergrowth on the airport to eliminate food 
or cover for wildlife (Seamans et al. 2007, 
Washburn et al. 2007, Bernhardt et al. 2009, 
Linnell et al. 2009). Airport managers should 
check with local jurisdictions to determine if 
arbor permits are needed before removing or 
trimming trees.
One can thus see that wildlife hazard 
management on and around airports is heavily 
regulated. The airport manager should require 
that training of personnel strictly adheres to 
all federal, state, and local regulations, as well 
as secure all necessary permits, licensing and 
certifications. Failure of the airport manager to 
comply with all regulations could be a severe 
liability to the airport operator. This liability 
could range from the loss of the airport manager’s 
job to the possible loss of the airport operating 
certificate. Federal and state permits pertaining 
to threatened and endangered species, species 
of special concern, and species protected by 
law contain strict permit conditions. Large civil 
fines can be imposed on airport managers who 
violate permit conditions. The biggest regulatory 
liability that airport managers or airport 
directors face is imposition of felony criminal 
charges against them for infractions of permit 
conditions. For this reason, airport managers 
should seek professional assistance from the 
USDA/Wildlife Services, FAA staff wildlife 
biologist, environmental lawyers, professional 
environmental consultants, Audubon Birds 
of Prey Center experts, forestry rangers, and 
tree removal experts. Ironically, some agency 
permits have such severe conditions concerning 
criminal prosecution that it is advisable for 
the airport manager to refuse the permit and, 
of course, disregard the actions for which the 
permit was required.
Sanford Airport Authority (SAA), Florida, for 
example, was issued a permit to use paintball 
guns to disperse bald eagles, but the SAA 
refused to take the risk of accidentally killing an 
American bald eagle and returned the permit. 
A professional golfer from Orlando is currently 
being prosecuted for animal cruelty when he 
accidentally hit and killed a hawk with a golf ball 
during an instructional video shoot. Imagine the 
possibilities if an airport operator accidentally 
kills an American bald eagle. Other agencies, 
such as state water management districts, COE, 
EPA, state environmental protection agencies, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration , and local 
departments of cities and counties may take 
enforcement action against an airport manager 
who fails to secure required permits or licensing 
or fails to comply with permit and licensing 
conditions.
   
Inadequate public awareness and 
support
If bird-strike mitigation efforts involve 
environmentally and socially sensitive bird 
species (e.g., bald eagles, ospreys [Pandion 
haliaetus], sand hill cranes [Grus canadensis], 
great blue herons [Ardea herodias]), airport 
managers may receive criticism from such 
groups as the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, 
and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, as well as from concerned residents. 
When these critics call the local newspaper 
and television and radio stations, any resulting 
adverse media attention will focus on airport 
managers and operators. Airport management 
must learn to ignore criticism and well-
meaning, but uninformed, journalism and 
proceed with the legal responsibility to mitigate 
wildlife strikes. If airport managers meet 
all of the legal obligations, they will greatly 
reduce liability in the event of a tragic crash 
due to a bird strike on or near their airport. 
Property damage, personal injuries, 
and fatalities
Should a plane crash occur on or near an 
airport due to a wildlife strike or bird strike, civil 
and criminal liability suits due to negligence of 
the airport manager and other airport officials 
can be devastating to the airport sponsor. Even 
if the aircraft does not crash, but rather aborts 
takeoff or makes a precautionary landing, 
the damage caused by a bird strike can be 
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enormous, as the following examples suggest. 
(Unless otherwise noted, data are taken from 
Cleary and Dolbeer 2005, Wright 2008, and 
Dolbeer unpublished data).
On May 25, 2008, a Kalitta Airlines car-• 
go B-747-200 (based in Michigan) struck 
a Eurasian kestrel (Falco tinnunculus) 
on the takeoff run at Brussels National 
Airport. Even though the pilot was 
able to stop the takeoff, the aircraft 
overran the runway, broke in half and 
was destroyed. The B-747 came within 
500 m of housing.
On August 23, 2000, a B-747 struck • 
a flock of geese on the takeoff run at 
Philadelphia International Airport. 
The B-747 ingested 1 or 2 birds in the 
#1 engine, and the high-speed aborted 
takeoff resulted in 9 flat tires. The 
engine was a total loss, and the repair 
cost was $3 million.  
On July 24, 2008, an Air Mauritius • 
aircraft with 241 people on board 
caught fire after colliding with a 
bird just as it was taking off from the 
Delhi, India, airport. “Had the fire 
not extinguished in time or the plane 
had taken off, it would have definitely 
blown up either on ground or mid-
air,” an official said (CAA Airport 
News 2008).
On June 9, 2001, an Airbus 300, during • 
its climb, struck a Canada goose at 
700 m above ground level. The goose 
was ingested into the #2 engine. A 
precautionary landing was made. Cost 
to replace the engine was $2 million.
On February 17, 2004, a B-757-200 • 
struck a flock of mallards (Anas 
platyrhynchos) on its takeoff run 
at Portland International Airport, 
Washington. At least 1 bird was 
ingested, and a precautionary landing 
was made. The cost to replace the 
engine was $2.5 million. 
On June 24, 2005, an Airbus 310 struck • 
multiple Philippine ducks (Anas 
luzanica) on its takeoff run at Subic 
Bay airport, resulting in an aborted 
takeoff. The fan blades were badly 
damaged, a large section of the nose 
cowl was torn from the nacelle (i.e., 
exterior protective covering), and the 
fan cowling was damaged. Engine 
shrapnel damaged the #3 flap fairing. 
The cost to repair the damage was 
$9,456,000.
On March 22, 2006, an Airbus 319 • 
struck a flock of Canada geese while 
it was on its 4-km final approach to 
General Mitchell International Air-
port, Wisconsin. One or 2 geese were 
ingested, and the engine shut down. 
The pilot reported an emergency and 
was able to land safely. There was 
major damage to the engine’s core, 
and the engine was replaced at a cost 
of $2,675,600.
Damage to general aviation aircraft and 
helicopters also can be costly.
On August 17, 2005, a Cessna 421 • 
descending to 600 m above ground 
level, struck a black vulture (Coragyps 
atratus) at Merritt Island, Florida. 
The collision ripped the aircraft wing 
causing fuel to spray out and damage 
the landing gear recognition light, 
so the pilot was not sure if the gear 
was down. The Florida Secretary of 
Transportation was on board along 
with other dignitaries.
On September 1, 2005, a Falcon 20 • 
struck a flock of mourning doves 
(Zenaida macroura) shortly after rotation 
at Lorain County, Ohio, causing the #1 
engine to flame out. As the gear was 
retracted, the plane hit another flock, 
which caused the #2 engine revolutions 
to roll back. The pilot crash-landed, 
sliding through a ditch and an airport 
perimeter fence, crossing a road, and 
coming to a stop in a cornfield. Both 
pilots were taken to the hospital. Costs 
totaled $1.4 million.
On December 30, 2005, a Bell 206 • 
helicopter was at 150 m above ground 
level near Washington, Louisiana, 
when it stuck a large vulture (Cathartes 
aura) that crashed into the windshield, 
temporarily blinding the pilot. The 
pilot tried to land in a bean field, but the 
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bird’s blood hampered his vision. The 
left skid hit the ground first, causing 
the aircraft to tip on its side. The pilot 
had several surgeries to repair his face, 
teeth and eye. The cost to repair the 
helicopter was $1.5 million.
Liability for damage from bird strikes is not, 
of course, limited to destruction of aircraft 
or persons on board. In many instances, the 
aircraft may crash into either a busy highway or 
occupied buildings, and the devastation from 
the initial impact and sometimes horrendous 
fires can be catastrophic. Even if no injuries or 
fatalities occur, the financial liability for damage 
to structures or vehicles on the ground can be 
tremendous.
On August 27, 2000, a B-747, during its • 
climb out of Los Angeles International 
Airport, struck a western gull (Larus 
occidentalis) at 150 m above ground 
level. The jet engine ingested the gull, 
and the pilot made an emergency 
landing with the jet spewing 3- to 
4-m-long flames. Three pieces of the 
engine fell to the ground, with one 
2-m piece landing on a beach where 
people were having a cookout (luckily 
no one was injured). The pilot dumped 
75 metric tons of fuel over the ocean 
before landing. 
On February 26, 1973, a Learjet 24 • 
departing from Peachtree-Dekalb 
Airport, Georgia, struck a flock of 
brown-headed cowbirds (Molothrus 
ater). Engine failure resulted, and the 
aircraft crashed, killing 8 people and 
seriously injuring 1 person on the 
ground.
A more serious liability (both emotionally and 
financially) is a crash on or near the airport that 
involves serious injuries or fatalities to people 
both onboard the aircraft and on the ground.
On July 8, 2003, a Cessna 172 struck a • 
vulture at 250 m above ground level 
near McKinney, Texas. The pilot made 
a Mayday call to the airport tower 
after the bird struck the left wing, 
announcing that he could not keep 
the aircraft straight with the power 
on and that he was going to land in a 
field. The plane came to rest upright 
with the engine separated from the 
firewall. The left wing was separated 
at the wing attach points, and the fuel 
tanks had ruptured and were leaking. 
Witnesses on the ground saw the 
plane hit with left wing first; 2 people 
on board were killed.
On July 8, 2007, a Cessna 182 swerved • 
to avoid an eagle at 20 m above ground 
level on its approach to Matinicus 
Island, Maine. The plane hit the 
treetops near the runway and crashed, 
destroying the aircraft and injuring 2 
people.
On October 23, 2007, a Piper 44 • 
disappeared on a night-training flight 
at 1,000 m above ground level out of 
Browerville, Minnesota. The instructor 
and student pilot did not report any 
difficulties, but wreckage was found 
36 hours later, partially submerged 
upside down in a bog. From part of 
a wing and some remains inside, the 
Smithsonian Institution, Division of 
Birds, identified the bird that struck the 
left horizontal stabilizer as a Canada 
goose. Both pilots were killed.
In March 2008, a Citation II, departing • 
from the Wiley Post, Oklahoma, airport 
during its ascent, struck a number of 
unidentified birds.  A witness heard 
a series of bangs and observed the jet 
trailing smoke and plunge straight 
down into the ground. All 5 people on 
board were killed on impact (Birdstrike 
News 2008). 
In October 2007, the University of • 
North Dakota’s twin-engine Seminole 
trainer was en route at about 1,200 m 
above ground level when it struck a 
flock of Canada geese. The airplane 
had multiple impact points and 
crashed into a swamp, killing both 
crew members (Birdstrike News 
2008).
On May 25, 2000, a Cessna 310 climbing • 
out of L. M. Clayton Airport, Montana, 
collided with several Canada geese 
at 183 m above ground level. The 
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windshield was shattered, and the 
right wing and fuel tank were ripped 
off on impact, destroying the aircraft 
in a post-crash fire. The pilot was 
hospitalized with burns and lacerations. 
Civil lawsuits
Many civil lawsuits have been filed, citing 
the negligence of airport managers and airport 
operators contributing to property loss, 
serious injuries, and fatalities after a bird strike 
attributed aircraft incident on or near airports.
A significant court precedent was • 
established when a Learjet 24 crashed 
on departure from Peachtree-Dekalb 
Airport, Georgia, in 1973. The plane 
crashed after striking a flock of 
cowbirds; 8 people were killed, and 1 
person on the ground was seriously 
injured. The crash generated a lengthy 
legal case, called the Miree litigation. 
The court determined that the airport 
manager could be held liable for failing 
to take the precautions possible at his 
level of authority to end bird hazards 
(Michael 1986). 
On November 12, 1975, a DC 10 • 
ingested several gulls into the #3 
engine during the takeoff run at John 
F. Kennedy International Airport. The 
engine caught fire; several wheels and 
tires disintegrated, and the landing 
gear collapsed during the aborted 
takeoff. The aircraft then caught 
fire and was destroyed; 30 of the 
139 passengers and crew (all airline 
employees being ferried overseas) were 
injured, but there were no fatalities. 
The National Transportation Safety 
Board noted that ineffective control of 
bird hazards by the airport was one of 
the factors contributing to the incident. 
A complex legal battle in federal and 
state courts ensued in 1979, with the 
airline and the aircraft owner suing the 
FAA, the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey, New York City, and 
several aerospace companies. The total 
settlement, reached in 1985, exceeded 
$15 million. Amounts paid by each 
party and their insurance companies 
were undisclosed.
On September 22, 1995, an AWACS • 
B-707 out of Elmendorf Air Force Base, 
Alaska,  ingested 4 Canada geese into 
the #1 and #2 engines during takeoff. The 
resulting crash killed all 24 people on 
board. Investigators found the “worst 
possible combination of operational 
conditions,” including infrequent 
and inadequate wildlife patrols. The 
senior tower controller was reported 
by witnesses as saying he “observed 
geese lift off and turn directly into the 
path of the aircraft.” Both controllers 
on duty at the time of the accident 
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights 
to remain silent, but the investigator 
concluded that both controllers “had 
a duty to warn the flight crew and 
that failure was a contributing factor." 
After the investigation, people in the 
top 3 leadership positions at the air 
base were reassigned.
On June 3, 1995, an Air France • 
Concorde, while landing at John 
F. Kennedy International Airport, 
ingested 1 or 2 Canada geese into the 
#3 engine at about 3 m above ground 
level. This caused an uncontained 
failure. Shrapnel from the #3 engine 
destroyed the #4 engine and cut 
hydraulic lines and control cables. The 
pilot made a successful emergency 
landing, but damage to the Concorde 
was >$7 million. The French Aviation 
Authority sued the Port Authority 
of New York and New Jersey and 
eventually settled out of court for $5.3 
million.
On June 7, 1989, a TNT Air Cargo • 
BAE 146 departing Genoa Airport, 
Italy, at night flew through a flock of 
gulls at rotation. Three engines were 
damaged, but the pilot managed to 
return the severely damaged aircraft 
to the airport. The carrier sued a 
number of entities for damages. The 
Civil Court of Genoa in 2001, after 11 
years of litigation, awarded the carrier 
$2 million. Liability was assigned as 
50% to the Ministry of Transport, 30% 
to the private company operating the 
airport, and 20% to the port authority. 
(Battistoni 2003).
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On December 12, 1973, a Falcon • 
Business Jet with 9 people on board 
struck common gulls (Larus canus) and 
black-headed gulls (Chroicocephalus 
ridibundus) on takeoff from Norwich 
Airport, England. One minor injury 
resulted from the crash, which 
destroyed the aircraft. The judge 
presiding over the case wrote that 
the airport operator owed the aircraft 
operator and occupants the “common 
duty of care." The judge decided that 
the airport operator failed to show due 
diligence in managing the airport’s bird 
hazards, and there must be judgment 
for the aircraft operator (Michael 1986, 
MacKinnon et al. 2001).
On June 14, 1975, a Sabreliner ingested • 
gulls in both engines at rotation from 
Watertown Airport, South Dakota. 
The aircraft crashed, and a severe fire 
ensued, injuring 3 of the 6 people on 
board and destroying the aircraft. 
When a suit was brought against the 
airport operator, the court maintained 
that the proximate cause of the crash 
was the failure to warn the pilot of the 
presence of birds. Judgment for the 
full value of the destroyed aircraft was 
entered against the airport operator 
(Michael 1986, MacKinnon et al. 
2001).
When a B-737 ingested a gull and • 
aborted the takeoff at Pula, Croatia, the 
airline sent a bill to the airport, which 
the airport refused to pay, stating that 
it “had a permanent (NOTAM) [i.e., 
notice to airmen] to warn air carriers 
of birds in the vicinity of the runway. 
When the insurance company sued the 
airport, the appeals court ruled in favor 
of the insurance company. The court 
noted that the airport acknowledged 
that a problem existed by having a 
permanent NOTAM regarding bird 
hazards, and yet failed to undertake 
all measures at its disposal to alleviate 
the hazard (Pula County Court 2000).
When an Air France A-320 hit a • 
flock of gulls during the takeoff run 
at Marseille Provence, France, the 
engine was destroyed. In January 2005 
the airline was awarded $4 million 
because of negligence in operating the 
airfield. A hedgehog (Erinacedae sp.) 
had been struck by an earlier flight 
(which attracted the gulls), but airport 
operations personnel had failed to 
remove the carcass.
Criminal charges
Criminal negligence charges can be brought 
against airport managers, some as serious as 
involuntary manslaughter when fatalities are 
involved from a bird-strike crash on or near an 
airport.
On January 20, 1995, a Falcon 20 • 
struck a flock of birds during takeoff 
from Le Bourget Airport, France. The 
jet ingested birds in the left engine, 
causing the aircraft to crash, killing all 
10 people on board. An investigation 
found that the airport staff failed 
to perform routine bird-scaring 
operations prior to the crash. In 1998, 
French authorities laid charges for 
involuntary manslaughter against the 
Paris Airport Authority and 3 former 
officers for their roles in the accident. 
The airport authority was accused of 
“negligently failing to follow normal 
security procedures” (MacKinnon et 
al. 2001, Cleary and Dolbeer 2005).
When a U.S. Air Force AWACS B-707 • 
engine ingesting geese and crashed in 
Alaska, killing all 24 people on board, 
the senior controller and another 
controller at the tower had to invoke 
their Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent when investigated for their part 
in the crash.
Conclusion
The courts have ruled that airport operators 
must exercise due diligence in undertaking 
all measures at their disposal to alleviate bird 
hazards at airports. Failing to do so could 
bring civil judgments and criminal charges 
upon airport managers and operators. When 
civil suits and criminal charges are filed, court 
cases can drag out through the court system 
for years. Court costs, attorney fees, and expert 
fees can cost the airport manager and operator 
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millions of dollars in defense fees and settlement 
judgments.
To avoid potential liability issues, airport 
managers and operators must: 
Clearly meet the legal responsibilities • 
placed on them by the overlapping 
federal, state, and local regulations;
Have a working knowledge of all • 
required permits, licenses, and 
certificates required by these agencies;  
Clearly understand the legally • 
enforceable permit conditions and be 
absolutely certain that these conditions 
are met and documented; 
Ensure that all personnel have received • 
the required training necessary for 
wildlife management on the airport; 
Seek out advice from environmental • 
lawyers, professional assistance from 
the USDA, Wildlife Services, FAA staff 
biologists, environmental consultants, 
and experts from such groups as the 
Audubon Society and Centers for 
Birds of Prey; and 
Complete a wildlife assessment of • 
hazards at the airport and implement 
a wildlife hazard management plan, 
as required in the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR; U.S. Code 1973). 
Wildlife hazard management at airports is a 
publicly-sensitive and complex undertaking, 
and airport managers will receive public 
criticism and negative news coverage when 
carrying out their duties (especially if the bird 
species are socially sensitive, as are bald eagles). 
Nonetheless, airport managers must diligently 
pursue their legal duty to protect the traveling 
public and their airport authority. 
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